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Abstract
This paper shows the estimates of National Transfer Accounts (NTA) for Spain in 2006 disaggregated 
by education level. Overall, our results indicate that, besides age population composition, education 
level has a big impact on the economic behavior of households and, hence, on the aggregate economy. 
Educated households tend to participate more and longer in the labor market, to produce more and, 
consequently, to consume more. As differences in consumption are lower than in labor income, they 
are able to contribute to the public system with higher taxes and contributions, and they depend less on 
public transfers over their lifecycle. Therefore, education seems to be crucial to sustain the welfare state 
in an ageing society.
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1. Introduction
Individuals need to consume over their entire lifecycle in order to meet their needs, while 
in general they can only generate resources during their working age. This implies that some
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mechanisms are necessary in order to reallocate resources over the human lifecycle. These 
reallocations can just imply an intertemporal distribution - for example, individuals can save 
during their working-age period to finance their old age. However, these mechanisms might 
often involve an intergenerational transfer dimension, reallocating resources between diffe­
rent generations. This is the case of family transfers: parents take care of their children as 
their parents did, and maybe also take care of their elderly, in turn expecting their own des­
cendants to do the same.
What about public transfers? Over the 20th century, many countries have developed a set 
of public expenditure programs devoted to covering the basic needs of their citizens, which 
have come to be called the Welfare State (WS). Although important differences among coun­
tries remain as regards the characteristics, size and coverage of WS programs, it can be said 
that they are based on four pillars: education, health, pensions and other social services. The 
WS is per se another mechanism (in addition to market and families) to reallocate resources 
over the lifecycle of individuals, but mainly for interpersonal distribution, as most WS pro­
grams are explicitly or implicitly organized on a pay-as-you-go basis (transfers are financed 
by the taxes collected in the same period). Education is a clear example of redistribution to 
the young, while pensions -and also health and long-term care- are mostly directed toward 
the elderly.
The role of intergenerational transfers in a society has been studied since the pioneering 
work of Samuelson (1958), who introduced the overlapping generation models into econo­
mic analysis. Numerous contributions have been made on this issue since then, but the lack 
of data has limited the extent of empirical conclusions for a long time (Willis, 1988; Lee et 
al., 1994; Auerbach et al., 1991; Albertini et al., 2008). In the early 2000s, an international 
project called National Transfer Accounts (NTA) was launched in order to construct a new 
international data set containing information about the reallocation of resources between 
ages in each country. NTA disentangle the economic flows taking place between age groups 
of population in a given year and a given country. The estimates complement information 
provided by National Accounts, being consistent with them, and allowing engaging analyses. 
By way of example, NTA data are extremely useful to study the economic effects of ageing 
(in both the public and the private transfer system). Also, they can be used to test the exis­
tence and length of the so-called demographic dividend (the effects of demographics on 
economic growth).
The basic NTA approach only takes into account age groups of individuals, without in­
corporating any kind of population heterogeneity. Some extensions of NTA have subse­
quently been derived, including some kind of heterogeneity, hence improving the explana­
tory power of these estimates. Among others, it is worth mentioning the estimation of NTA 
profiles disaggregated by gender, especially if data on time use are also incorporated. In this 
way, NTA provide information by age and sex on resource reallocations not only regarding 
market activities but also for non-market ones, such as housework and care (see Donehower 
and Mejía-Guevara, 2012; Hammer et al., 2015; Zannella, 2015; Renteria et al., 2016). 
Another interesting extension of NTA would be to disaggregate NTA profiles by socioeco­
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nomic status, using some indicator like household income level. For example, Turra et al., 
(2011) used NTA profiles differentiated by income groups to analyze the incidence of public 
transfers in Brazil and Chile. Miller et al., (2014), Mejia-Guevara (2015) and Hammer 
(2016) construct NTA by education level for Chile, Mexico and Austria, respectively. This is 
the extension we also develop in this paper, in this case applied to Spain, estimating the NTA 
disaggregated by education level of household head, in order to identify the differences in 
behavior patterns over the lifecycle. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
summarizes NTA methodology. In Section 3, we explain the data and estimation process. 
Section 4 presents the results and discusses the main findings. Finally, Section 5 contains the 
conclusion.
2. An overview of National Transfer Accounts
The international project to construct NTA was launched in the early 2000s. It initially 
involved seven countries, which nowadays are more than 40 from all over the world (inclu­
ding Spain). First NTA results for a selected group of countries were published by Lee and 
Mason (2011). NTA roots are in the broad literature on intergenerational transfers, involving 
both economic and demographic aspects. This highlights the fact that a system to transfer 
resources across ages is needed, as individuals only produce during a limited period of their 
lives, while they consume throughout their lifecycle. NTA disentangle how resources move 
between the different age groups in an economy in a given year. Hence, NTA provide com­
plementary information to National Accounts (NA) of each country, being consistent with 
them. Moreover, NTA estimates are also internationally comparable, because they are cons­
tructed following a common methodology (UN, 2013). The starting point of the NTA method 
is the following transformation of the NA identity:
YL + YA + TG+ + TF+ = C + S + TG- + TF- [1]
Where YL is labor income, YA asset income, C consumption, S savings and TG and TF re­
present public and private transfers, respectively, being positive when they are received by 
individuals (inflows, +) or negative when they are paid by individuals (outflows, -). Equation
[1] summarizes the resources constraint for the whole economy in a given period (time subs­
cripts are omitted for simplicity), but also for each individual of each particular age. The 
different sources of revenues on the left-hand side (labor income, asset income and public 
and private transfers received) finance expenses collected on the right-hand side (consump­
tion, savings, transfers to public sector -  through taxes and social contributions -  and to other 
private individuals). Rearranging Equation [1], we obtain:
C -  YL = (YA -  S) + (TF+ -  TF-) + (TG+ -  TG ) [2]
The difference between consumption and labor income on the left-hand side of equation
[2] is the so-called lifecycle deficit (LCD), which is typically positive at the beginning and
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the end of the lifecycle (childhood and old age) and negative in the middle (working life). 
The LCD should be financed through the three possible mechanisms expressed on the right- 
hand side. First, through asset-based reallocations (ABR), that is to say individuals can allo­
cate their asset income, save and dissave to transfer their income intertemporally. Second, 
through private transfers typically made on an intra-household basis, but that could also 
occur between households (inter-household transfers). Finally, age reallocations can also 
take place through transfers made by the public sector, like education, health, pensions and 
unemployment programs, among others. The role of each of these three mechanisms varies 
across countries -in  particular, public transfers are more important in countries with conso­
lidated welfare states- but also by age groups within the same country. This is one of the 
interesting features that NTA data make it possible to analyze, as it provides age profiles of 
resource reallocations. Figure 1 shows the amount of public (TG) and private (TF) transfers 
received by children (ages 0-19) and the elderly (ages 65 and over) in different countries with 
NTA data available. Data are expressed as a percentage of average labor income for ages 
30-49 in the same country in order to make them comparable. As can be observed, public 
transfers are more important in European countries, and also in the USA, Brazil and Japan, 
while private transfers play the main role in age resource reallocations in other Asian and 
Latin American countries. Clearly, public transfers are mainly directed toward the elderly in 
almost all countries. For example, in Sweden a person aged 65 or over receives in public 
transfers an average of 110% the average labor income for ages 30-49 in the country, while 
a young under 20 year old receives only 32%. In the case of Spain, public transfers are lower, 
but again clearly unbalanced in favor of the elderly, who receive almost 50% of average labor 
income for ages 30-49, while children receive barely 17%.
G E M M A  A B IO , C O N C E P C IO  P A T X O T , E L IS E N D A  R E N T E R ÍA
A N D  G U A D A L U P E  S O U T O
Figure 1a: Per capita public (TG) and private (TF) transfers received 
by children in NTA countries (as percentage of the average 
labor income for ages 30-49 in the same country)
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Figure 1b: Per capita public (TG) and private (TF) transfers received 
by the elderly in NTA countries (as percentage of the average 
labor income for ages 30-49 in the same country)
Note: Estimations refer to the following years: 1996 (Brazil), 1998 (Taiwan), 1999 (Philippines), 2000 (Austria, 
Spain and South Korea), 2003 (Germany, Sweden and USA), 2004 (Costa Rica, India, Japan, Mexico, Slovenia and 
Thailand), 2005 (Hungary and Indonesia).
Source: Authors’ elaboration with NTA data (www.ntaccounts.org).
To summarize, NTA provide rich information about resource allocation between ages 
which was not previously available. Nevertheless, many factors apart from age influence the 
specific economic behavior of individuals. This is the case of socioeconomic status, which 
has given rise to an extension of NTA methodology in order to obtain estimations of age 
profiles disaggregated by this characteristic. Some recent works show that economic profiles 
by age are significantly different when including some indicator of individual socioeconomic 
status. Turra et al. (2011) estimated public transfers by income quartiles for Brazil and Chile. 
More recently, Miller et al. (2014) and Mejia-Guevara (2015) provided NTA estimations 
disaggregated by education level of household head for Chile and Mexico, respectively. They 
show that the high inequality indicators in these countries give rise to a very different resou­
rce allocation for individuals of different socioeconomic status. For example, Miller et al. 
(2014) estimate that children in households whose head has not completed secondary school 
receive barely half the educational investment of households with tertiary education. In Eu­
rope, Hammer (2015) has estimated complete NTA by individual education level in Austria, 
showing considerable differences in most profiles, such as labor income, taxes or public 
transfers received, among others.
In this paper, we construct NTA for Spain disaggregated by education level of household 
head. Education attainment and income level of individuals (or households) are clearly 
linked. Figure 2 shows the distribution of Spanish households observed in the European
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Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) according to the level of education of 
the household head and the total income of the household -aggregated monetary income 
obtained by all household members. As observed, there is a clear relation between level of 
studies and total income. In the highest total income deciles, two thirds of households have 
a head with post-secondary education, while only 9% have primary studies. The picture is 
exactly the opposite for the households in the lowest income deciles.
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Figure 2: Distribution of Spanish households according to their total income level 
(in deciles) and the level of education of the household head
Source: Authors’ elaboration from EU-SILC referring to 2006.
Our focus will be on education attainment instead of income distribution, given that 
education can be considered a more stable and better predictor of the permanent income of 
the household than the income observed in a particular year. In this way, our results comple­
ment others previously obtained in literature on inequality. For example Cantó (2013), using 
data from EUROMOD, analyzes the distributive effects of taxes and in-cash transfers on 
disposable income of families in Spain between 2005 and 2011. Calero and Gil (2013) focus 
on the distributive effects of public education and health policies.
3. Constructing NTA profiles by level of education in Spain
Different micro data sets are used in each country to estimate NTA. Age prohles are 
constructed hrst in per capita terms. Afterwards, each aggregate prohle is obtained by mul­
tiplying the per capita age prohle by the population age distribution. Aggregate prohles are
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then adjusted to the corresponding aggregate values provided by National Accounts, in order 
to make both data sources consistent. The estimation process of age profiles is complex and 
usually conditioned by data availability (see UN, 2013 for specific details). This complexity 
justifies the fact that most countries have estimations for only a few years. This Section is 
devoted to describing the data and estimation procedure of NTA in Spain, disaggregated by 
level of education referring to 2006.
The level of education in this study is a measure used to distribute households among 
socioeconomic groups. As explained above, educational attainment is a more stable indicator 
of the household’s socioeconomic status in the long term, not affected by variations in the 
annual income. Besides labor income and other individual social transfers, the rest of the 
variables are obtained at the household level such as, for example, consumption, implying 
that household features may be more important than individual characteristics, especially for 
children. For this reason, we measure education attainment at the household and not at indi­
vidual level. In particular, we assign households according to education level of household 
head, defined in the NTA as the person with the highest income in the household. The edu­
cation level or education attainment is measured in the surveys as a categorical indicator that 
we finally grouped in three categories: compulsory, complete secondary and post-secondary. 
Based on these assumptions, NTA profiles were constructed separately for households be­
longing to each education category.
The basic NTA equation Eq. [2] needs to be balanced for each age group (x) and educa­
tion level (s):
C -  YL = (YA -  S i  + (TF+xs -  TF-x )  + (TG+ T G - ) [3]
To do that, we construct profiles of each variable by education level of the household 
(when data are available), and then we adjust the sum of the aggregate amount of each spe­
cific group to match the total -for all education groups- profile by age.
When considering total population, net public transfers must equal zero, as well as net 
private intra-household transfers. This is because in NTA by construction all transfer inflows 
should be reallocated as transfer outflows. In the case of public transfers, this implies that 
each expenditure program is covered by general taxes or by an earmarked tax when there is 
one -like social contributions for contributory pensions. When flows received by the gover­
nment do not equal payments made to the government, the excess or deficit is considered as 
public asset-based reallocations. When profiles are divided into educational groups, the same 
procedure applies, although net transfers equal zero only at the aggregate level but not ne­
cessarily for each education group.
We rely on different databases to construct economic age profiles for each variable. We 
use the Household Budget Survey (EPF) to estimate private consumption profiles, and the 
European Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) to construct income profiles. 
Regarding the age profiles of private transfers, they are estimated combining both databases
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mentioned above. Finally, public consumption, pensions and other social expenditure data 
are extracted from different statistics published by the government (Ministries of Employ­
ment and Social Security -MEYSS-; Education -M ECD- and Health and Social Services 
-MSSSI) and the NHS (National Health Survey) produced by INE (National Statistics Ins­
titute). National economic aggregates, used to adjust the resulting profiles, come from Spa­
nish National Accounts (INE). All databases used refer to 2006, chosen as our base year in 
order to avoid any effect of the economic cycle on the transfer profiles.
Disaggregation by education level is only available for those data extracted from indivi­
dual surveys (EPF, EU-SILC) and for the NHS. This means that, unfortunately, it is not 
possible to obtain all the profiles disaggregated by education level. This is the case of public 
consumption (education, public hospitalization and other public consumption) and some 
public cash transfers that are not very well specified in the EU-SILC survey, such as survi­
vorship pensions. On the other hand, it is worth mentioning that education classification in 
the two main surveys (EPF and EU- SILC) used to construct the profiles differs slightly, 
which finally forced us to group education attainment in only three categories: primary, se­
condary and post-secondary. The difficulties in combining both classifications come basica­
lly from the legal changes introduced in the Spanish educational system by the LOGSE from 
1990 onwards1. Until the LOGSE, only primary education (until age 14) was compulsory, 
while after its approval the first stage of secondary education (ages 14-16) also became com­
pulsory. In the EPF survey, the compulsory education category includes all the former stu­
dents that only finished primary education, but also those who completed the first stage of 
secondary education after the LOGSE. However, the EU-SILC does not contain a category 
for compulsory education, but rather one for general secondary education, mixing the first 
stage of secondary education (currently in the compulsory stage) with a secondary level 
existing in the past, more equivalent to the current second stage of secondary education. 
Regarding higher education, EU-SILC considers all degrees that require a second stage of 
secondary education for admission, which is a broader definition of post-secondary educa­
tion than the one in EPF (‘university degrees or equivalent education’). Table 1 shows the 
category matching we performed between the classifications from both surveys.
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Table 1
EDUCATION CATEGORIES IN EPF AND EU-SILC SURVEYS, 
AND FINAL CLASSIFICATION OF EDUCATION GROUPS
EPF EU-SILC Final classification
Illiterate
Incomplete compulsory Primary Primary
Compulsory*
Professional training stage 1 First stage secondary
Secondary
Second stage secondary education Second stage secondary
Professional training stage 2 Professional training stage 2
Post-secondary
University University
* Compulsory education refers to ‘only primary’for generations born before 1982, and refers to ‘primary + first 
stage of secondary education’ for generations born after 1982.
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Figure 3 compares the population distribution by age and education level resulting from 
both surveys (EU-SILC and EPF). Some differences are observed between the two distribu­
tions, specially concentrated in the younger generations (ages 10-30) with the lowest level 
of education. We used the distribution observed in the EU-SILC, as it is closer to the one 
observed in the population censuses available for 20112.
Figure 3: Population distribution by age and level of education of the household head 
in Spain 2006 (EPF and EU-SILC)
Note: Dashed lines refer to EPF and continuous lines to EU-SILC.
Source: Authors’ calculations from EPF (2006) and EU-SILC (2007).
Below we give more details about the construction of the different NTA profiles.
3.1. Lifecycle deficit (LCD)
As stated in Eqs. [2] and [3], LCD is the difference between consumption (private and 
public) and labor income at each age and for each education level. Private consumption is 
estimated separately for education, health and ‘other consumption’ (including housing con­
sumption) using data from EPF survey. Education consumption for each age group is obtai­
ned by performing a regression of total education consumption in the household among the
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number of people aged less than 29 enrolled at school at each age. The estimated coefficients 
are then applied to the distribution of education consumption among the members of the 
household. Regarding health consumption, it is distributed among household members using 
coefficients of utilization of each item (hospitalization, outpatient care and pharmacy) obtai­
ned from available data on hospital stays (Conjunto Mínimo Básico de Datos -  CMBD) and 
the NHS. Finally, the rest of consumption is distributed by age using the following equivalent 
scale proposed by the NTA method (see UN, 2013):
20 -  x
a(x) = 1 -0 .6  + D(4 < x < 20)* - 0 .6 * D(x s  4) [4]
16
where x  refers to the age of the individual and D is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the 
condition inside the parenthesis is met, and zero otherwise. This equivalent scale allows the 
allocation of total other expenditure of household j to each household member i as follows:
CHHy (x) = CHHj / ^  x a(x)Mj  (x) [5]
where CHHij is the amount of other consumption by household member i in household j , 
CHHj is total other consumption of household j, and M (x) is the number of household mem­
bers of age x  in household j.
Regarding the second component of LCD, labor income profiles by age and education 
level are obtained from the data contained in the EU-SILC. Following the NTA methodolo­
gy, these profiles are estimated with the mean distribution by age in the EU-SILC separately 
for employees (salaried workers) and self-employed.
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3.2. Public Transfers
According to Eqs. [2] and [3], public transfers are divided into outflows (paid by 
individuals to the public sector) and inflows (received by individuals from the public 
sector). Outflows refer mainly to social contributions and taxes. Social contributions are 
estimated based on the estimated labor income profiles. In the case of taxes, the profiles 
are estimated at the maximum detailed category, using a mixture of consumption, income 
and asset profiles depending upon the type of tax. For example, profiles of special taxes 
on alcohol and tobacco are calculated using alcohol and tobacco consumption profile by 
age in the EPF survey. Public inflows are first split into in-kind (health, education, other) 
and cash benefits (pensions and other social transfers). In-kind profiles are assumed to be 
equal to the public consumption ones, and therefore the equivalent profiles were used. 
Regarding cash transfers, they are composed mainly of retirement pensions, but also in­
clude all kinds of social transfers. The information about their distribution by age is 
available in the EU-SILC, but also in the statistics published by Spanish public adminis­
trations (MEYSS) which refer to total population. Therefore, we construct the age profi­
les by education level using EU-SILC data and then they are adjusted to the aggregate by 
age observed in MEYSS.
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3.3. Private Transfers
Private transfers can take place inside the household -intra-household transfers- or 
between different households -inter-household. In both cases, they are estimated at the 
household level and, therefore, NTA methodology assumes that the household head is the 
owner of assets. In the case of inter-household transfers, this implies that transfers are 
undertaken between household heads. Inter-household transfer profiles are estimated using 
the EU-SILC survey, where the amount of transfers given or received from other house­
holds is specified. Regarding intra-household transfers, they should ideally be estimated 
using a survey containing information on both consumption and income. Unfortunately, 
this is not the case of Spain and many European countries -  as explained above, consump­
tion data are collected by EPF, while income is collected by EU-SILC. Hence, both data 
sets need to be combined3.
To construct the private transfer profiles, the standard NTA method assumes that the 
household head is the owner of all assets and, therefore, all asset flows (like housing servi­
ces) run from the household head to other members. Besides housing, transfers occur becau­
se members with a surplus (more income than consumption) make transfers to members with 
a deficit (more consumption than income). When the total sum of surpluses and deficits be­
comes a surplus or a deficit, the household head is responsible for balancing it using asset 
income or dissaving (in the case of deficit) or saving (in the case of surplus).
3.4. Asset-based reallocations
Profiles of asset-based reallocations are based on the previously described profiles of 
housing, total net transfers and lifecycle deficit, plus three new profiles for property income, 
capital income and interest payments. The three profiles are estimated from data in EU- 
SILC, based on the same assumption that assets are owned by the household head. Each of 
these profiles is adjusted to the corresponding aggregate of asset-based reallocations, in order 
to obtain final profiles of asset income and savings for the private and public spheres.
4. Analyzing intergenerational transfers by education level in Spain
In this Section we present the NTA age profiles disaggregated by education level of 
household head obtained for Spain for 2006. Figure 4 shows per capita labor income and 
consumption. Both present the expected pattern: while consumption is quite stable over the 
lifecycle- a little lower for children and the elderly -labor income is concentrated in the 
central period of working age. The average results -without differentiating by education 
level- are consistent with those previously obtained for Spain referring to other years (Patxot 
et al., 2011 for 2000; Patxot et al., 2015 for 2008).
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Figure 4: Per capita age profiles of consumption and labor income by level 
of education (Spain 2006)
Source: Authors ’ elaboration.
The effect observed for education level is remarkable, especially in the case of labor 
income. From age 25, individuals with secondary and post-secondary education earn clearly 
more than those with only primary studies. These differences reach a maximum at ages 45­
49, when the per capita labor income profile peaks. At that point, per capita labor earnings 
for those with post-secondary education reach €33,000 a year, representing 41% more than 
the figure observed for individuals with secondary education, and more than double the one 
corresponding to individuals with only primary studies. As the profiles shown are in per 
capita terms, they are influenced by the participation and employment rates, which differ 
significantly according to the level of education. Indeed, aggregated data of unemployment 
and participation rates by level of education show that participation in the labor market in­
creases with the educational attainment of individuals, while unemployment rates decrease. 
Table 2 shows the labor status of the household heads collected in the EU-SILC 2006, by age 
and education level. As observed, after age 25 -when the education period can be considered 
complete- both the participation and the employment rates are favorable for those indivi­
duals with higher education. This advantage moreover increases with age. As an example, 
from ages 55-64, only 3% of household heads with post-secondary studies are non-partici­
pants, compared with 11% of those with only primary education. Furthermore, in the same 
age category, 75% of participating household heads with post-secondary studies are emplo­
yed, compared with only 59% of those with just primary education.
It is also worth noting that, as Table 2 shows, individuals from households with post­
secondary education tend to remain more years in the labor market. First, looking at the age 
group 54-64 (close to the legal retirement age), 76% of individuals with post-secondary 
education participate in the labor market (75% are employed and 1% unemployed), compa­
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red with only 65% of those with only primary studies. On the contrary, non-participants and 
retired percentages are higher in the lowest education group. Second, 80% of individuals 
aged 65 and more with primary studies are retired, 2% employed and 18% are non-partici­
pants (probably meaning that they are not entitled to receive a retirement pension). Conver­
sely, individuals with higher education in the same age group who are non-participants only 
represent 5%, while the employed percentage is signihcantly higher (7%). This could have 
different explanations, such as that a good part of these highly educated individuals are libe­
ral professionals without a compulsory retirement age. Moreover, these jobs tend to be less 
influenced by the physical capacity of workers. Overall, the interaction between educational 
attainment and labor market characteristics leads to an expected, but interesting result: the 
higher the level of education the higher the labor income profile from age 25 on.
Table 2
LABOR STATUS OF HOUSEHOLD HEADS BY EDUCATION AND AGE GROUP 
IN SPAIN 2006 (IN % OF TOTAL POPULATION)
Age
Education
level
Non­
participant
Employed Unempl. Retired
primary 23% 67% 10% 0%
15-24 secondary 10% 83% 7% 0%
post-secondary 19% 73% 8% 0%
primary 4% 82% 15% 0%
25-34 secondary 2% 91% 7% 0%
post-secondary 1% 95% 3% 0%
primary 2% 87% 8% 3%
35-44 secondary 2% 94% 4% 1%
post-secondary 1% 97% 3% 0%
primary 6% 85% 5% 4%
45-54 secondary 3% 90% 4% 3%
post-secondary 2% 96% 2% 1%
primary 11% 59% 6% 24%
55-64 secondary 8% 61% 7% 24%
post-secondary 3% 75% 1% 22%
primary 18% 2% 0% 80%
65+ secondary 13% 4% 1% 82%
post-secondary 5% 7% 0% 88%
Source: Authors’ calculations from EU-SILC 2006.
Compared to other countries, Spain presents a similar labor income age profile to the 
one observed in other European countries such as Austria, Finland, Germany and Sweden, 
where labor participation of the elderly is low (Lee and Ogawa, 2011). On the other hand, 
the USA and other American and Asian countries present large elderly shares of labor 
participation.
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Differences by education level are also observed in the consumption profiles, although 
they are less important. Again, the higher the education level the greater the consumption 
level, the life pattern being practically the same in any case: consumption grows during 
childhood and tends to remain quite stable over the rest of the lifecycle. It is worth mentio­
ning that this trend is also observed in other countries, such as Austria, but differs from that 
observed in a few high-income countries (Sweden, Finland, Germany and the USA), where 
consumption grows sharply during late old age (Tung, 2011). The reason for the increase 
observed in these countries is public consumption -in-kind public transfers-, which increa­
ses dramatically after age 70-75, while private consumption tends to remain constant or even 
decrease.
The difference between consumption and labor income gives the lifecycle deficit (LCD) 
for each age group. The LCD can be considered as a measure of economic dependency. 
Typically, it is positive during childhood and old age -consumption is higher than labor in­
come- but negative in the middle years of the working age -when labor income exceeds 
consumption. The age range of negative LCD varies a little among countries, but in most 
cases becomes negative around age 25-29 and lasts until 55-59. This is also what we obser­
ved for Spain in 2006, but with some differences according to education level. While child­
hood dependency finishes near age 25 in all cases, the surplus period is longer the higher the 
education level. On the other hand, there are also differences in terms of the size of both the 
deficit and especially the surplus. Indeed, in the case of less educated individuals, deficits 
during childhood and old age are clearly higher than the small surplus they generate during 
the middle period of their lives. Higher educated individuals, although they have bigger de­
ficits, are able to generate much bigger surpluses due to their higher labor income.
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Figure 5a: Age profiles of Lifecycle deficit (LCD) by level of education in Spain 2006.
Per capita
Source: Authors ’ calculations.
Intergenerational Transfers in Spain: The Role o f Education 115
Figure 5b: Age profiles of Lifecycle deficit (LCD) by level of education in Spain 2006.
Aggregated
Source: Authors ’ calculations.
After observing Figures 4 and 5, the conclusion is clear: the higher the education level 
the higher the labor earnings and, as differences in consumption are smaller, the lower the 
LCD. The aggregate picture in the economy, plotted in panel b of Figure 5, depends on the 
population structure by age and education level, shown in Figure 3.1. During childhood, the 
highest aggregated LCD corresponds to individuals with secondary education (the most nu­
merous), while after age 60 the LCD is mainly generated by individuals with only primary 
education. Conversely, during the working-age period individuals with secondary and post­
secondary education give rise to most of the surplus, while only a small part is generated by 
individuals with only primary studies. Although the per capita prohles tend to be quite cons­
tant over time, aggregated hgures depend crucially on the age composition of the population 
and on the population distribution by education level.
Below we disentangle the mechanisms used to hnance LCD, according to Eq. [2]: trans­
fers (both public and private) and asset-based reallocations. The question is basically how 
the young and the elderly receive resources to hnance their consumption, as they are not able 
to obtain labor income. Figure 6 shows the public transfers received (inflows), estimated 
according to their age and education level. In the case of public transfers, only in-cash bene- 
hts are obtained disaggregated by education level, while in-kind transfers (health, education 
and other) are aggregated for all education levels.
As expected, public transfer inflows are concentrated in the two economic dependent life 
periods. While children receive mainly in-kind transfers (education and some health servi­
ces), the elderly obtain both in-kind (health care) and especially cash transfers (pensions). 
Unfortunately, as explained above, the EPC data do not allow disaggregation of in-kind pu-
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Figure 6: Per capita profiles of public transfer inflows by age and level of education
Source: Authors ’ elaboration.
blic transfers by education level. However, we could estimate private consumption age pro­
files of both education and health care disaggregated by education level of household head, 
shown in Figures 7 (education) and 8 (health care). As observed, public education is clearly 
the most important, especially among ages 5-19. From that age, public expenditure decreases 
sharply, and private expenditure becomes relatively more important. Also, it is worth noting 
that private expenditure increases significantly with the education level of the household. On 
average, it is observed that individuals in households with post-secondary education spend 
nearly four times more on private education than those in households with only primary 
studies (€4,894 compared with €1,289).
In the case of health (Figure 8), public expenditure is again clearly the highest at all ages. 
Some differences in private per capita expenditure according to the education level of hou­
sehold head are also observed, although they are lower than in the case of education. Hou­
seholds tend to complement public health care with some private expenditure, especially 
from age 45 onwards.
In the case of cash transfers, we observe that, from ages 35-55, the higher the education 
level the lower the cash transfers received. This probably reflects the lower unemployment 
rate of high-educated people, which implies that they receive less unemployment benefits. 
However, after age 65 the opposite occurs, in this case showing that individuals with better 
contribution careers (high-educated) obtain a higher retirement pension. If we look at the 
65-69 age group, when most individuals enter retirement, per capita cash benefits are almost 
10% higher for individuals with secondary studies than for individuals with only primary
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Figure 7: Per capita profiles of education expenditure (in € a year)
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
Figure 8: Per capita profile of health expenditure (in € a year)
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
education. In the case of individuals with post-secondary education, the difference with those 
with primary studies increases to 33%.
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If the education level of the household was a good indicator of its income level, the cash 
transfer inflow profiles observed (Figure 6) would mean that public expenditure has a limited 
impact on redistribution: the amount of cash benefits is a little lower for the most educated 
during the working-age period, but clearly higher at retirement age. In-kind transfers also 
play a role, which we are unable to evaluate properly due to the lack of data. However, they 
are considerably lower than the cash benefits after age 50. Hence, the redistributive impact 
of the public transfer system seems to be weak. Nevertheless, it is also necessary to look at 
the outflows profile -taxes and contributions paid- shown in Figure 9 to complete the pictu­
re about redistribution effects. Until age 25 very small differences are observed, but during 
the rest of their life high-educated individuals pay much more taxes and contributions to the 
public sector. The differences reach maximums in middle age. Individuals aged 45-49 with 
post-secondary education pay on average almost €15,000 a year in taxes and contributions, 
which is twice the amount paid by individuals of the same age with only primary education, 
and 42% more than those with secondary studies. Hence, the public transfer system seems 
to be redistributive, at least on the revenue side.
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Figure 9: Per capita profiles of public transfer outflows by age and level of education
Source: Authors ’ elaboration.
In order to complete the analysis about the redistribution effects of the public transfer 
system in Spain, in Figure 10 we plot the aggregated net public transfer profile -inflows less 
outflows- by education level according to the population distribution in 2006. We observe 
that, during early childhood, most public transfers are received by households with secon­
dary or higher education, as they are the most numerous. On the contrary, during old age 
most public transfers are directed toward the less educated. Although in general they receive
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much lower benefits (Figure 6), there are much more recipients with only primary studies at 
those ages. Moreover, we found that all education levels start to obtain negative net public 
transfers -they pay more taxes than they receive- at the same age -around 25-, while the 
lower the education level the sooner they start to obtain positive net public transfers at old 
age (age 55 for primary studies, 60 for secondary and a little later for post-secondary). Fina­
lly, during the working-age period taxes are mainly raised from individuals with post-secon­
dary and secondary education. It is important to note that this picture corresponds exclusi­
vely to that observed in 2006. As mentioned above, although per capita profiles tend to be 
quite stable, the aggregated profiles depend crucially on the population distribution, which is 
changing rapidly both in age composition and education level.
Figure 10: Aggregated profiles of net public transfers by age and level of education
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
The second mechanism to finance LCD is private transfers, which can take place inside 
the household -for example transfers from parents to children or between spouses- or bet­
ween different households -an example could be the elderly who give money to their des­
cendants living in another household, but also any other kind of private donation.
Figure 11 shows the age profile of net intra-household transfers obtained for Spain in 
2006, differentiating by education level. Children receive transfers from other family mem­
bers until age 25-30, but those in households with higher education receive considerably 
more. That difference peaks at ages 15-25, coinciding with the higher education period, and 
probably reflects the fact that children of high-educated families also tend to reach a high 
education level, needing more transfers. At ages 25-65, individuals give more transfers to the
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Figure 11: Per capita profiles of net intra-household transfers by age and level
of education
Source: Authors ’ elaboration.
other household members than they receive, whatever their education level. However, the 
size of those transfers is again clearly bigger for higher education levels -on average, an 
individual with post-secondary education aged 45-49 gives €10,429 a year to the rest of their 
household members, which is 43% and 130% higher than individuals with secondary and 
primary education, respectively. However, maybe the most interesting feature is observed 
during old age: while individuals with lower education practically do not receive or give 
transfers to the rest of the household members, those with secondary and post-secondary 
studies are net recipients of family transfers, although the size of those transfers is small. 
Rentería et al. (2016) reveal that this could be related to a gender issue: as most men of high- 
education level receive retirement pensions while only a few women do, the latter need to 
receive transfers from their spouses. Moreover, most of the elderly live alone or as a couple, 
although a lower education level increases the probability of them living with younger gene­
rations (Zueras and Ajenjo Cosp, 2010). This could be one of the reasons why the elderly of 
lower socioeconomic status are net donors of private transfers to other members of the hou­
sehold, especially when taking into account that the older generations are frequently the 
house-owners in extended families.
In Figure 12 we display the age profiles of inter-household transfers, differentiating in­
flows and outflows, by education level. The amount of inter-household transfers is much 
lower than that observed for intra-household transfers. In the case of inflows, it is almost not 
even worth mentioning differences by education level. However, they are more notable in the 
case of outflows, being higher educated individuals who make more transfers to other hou-
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Figure 12: Per capita profiles of inter-household transfers (inflows and outflows)
by age and level of education
Note: Solid lines refer to inflows and dashed lines to outflows.
Source: Authors ’ elaboration.
seholds. It should be noted that, by construction, the aggregate net inter-household transfers 
equal the net transfers of the country with the rest of the world. Hence, in a country with a 
relatively high proportion of foreigners (9.27% of the population in Spain in 2006), a nega­
tive transfer balance (remittances abroad exceed those received) is plausible.
Finally, asset-based reallocation is the third tool to hnance LCD according to Eq. [2]. It 
is especially relevant for the elderly -as they can save before they grow old- but not for 
children -  it would imply borrowing during childhood to repay the credit later. In order to 
show this, Figure 13 displays the relative importance of the different sources to hnance con­
sumption during childhood -ages 0-19- and old age -age 65 and over- estimated by educa­
tion level4. As can be observed, for children private transfers play the main role, followed by 
public transfers. On the contrary, labor income is very low at these ages, and asset-based 
reallocation is slightly negative5. In the case of the elderly, the differences by education level 
are more striking. Public transfers are clearly the most important source of hnancing for el­
derly consumption, although their importance decreases with education level. Individuals
122
with primary studies finance about 80% of their consumption with public transfers, while 
this share goes down to 67% and 51% in the case of individuals with secondary and post­
secondary education, respectively. Regarding labor income, its importance is more signifi­
cant the higher the education level. While the elderly with primary studies can barely finan­
ce 4% of their consumption needs with labor income, those with secondary and 
post-secondary studies finance 10% and 16%, respectively. The role of private transfers is 
also limited and, as seen above, individuals with only primary education are net givers, while 
the rest are net recipients. Finally, asset-based reallocation also plays a remarkable role in 
financing old-age consumption, a little lower in the case of individuals with secondary edu­
cation -who finance 12% of their consumption through asset-based reallocations-, while this 
share is 19% for individuals with primary studies and 25% for those with post-secondary 
studies.
G E M M A  A B IO , C O N C E P C IO  P A T X O T , E L IS E N D A  R E N T E R ÍA
A N D  G U A D A L U P E  S O U T O
0-19 65*
■  labor income »P u b lic Transfers ■  Labor Income ■  Public Transfers
■  Private Transfers ■  Asset Reallocations ■  Private Transfers ■  Asset Reallocations
Figure 13: Consumption financing of children (0-19) and the elderly (65+)
by level of education
Source: Authors ’ elaboration.
Overall, our results reveal that, besides age population composition, education level 
has a large impact on the economic behavior of households and, hence, on the size of 
macro magnitudes of the economy. By way of illustration, Table 3 summarizes the results 
of a simple simulation exercise, calculating the LCD with alternative scenarios of popu­
lation composition by education level. In particular, maintaining the profiles obtained by 
age and education level constant, we compute the aggregate LCD together with the con­
sumption and labor income in hypothetical scenarios where the entire population has the 
same education level (primary, secondary or post-secondary). The results show that edu­
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cation clearly matters. On the one hand, labor income with the whole population in post­
secondary level would be 129% of that observed with the actual distribution. On the other 
hand, consumption would also be higher (123%), but to a lesser extent. Consequently, 
aggregate LCD would go down to 76% of the value observed with the real population 
composition. Exactly the opposite occurs when we assume that the entire population has 
primary studies.
Table 3
NTA AGGREGATES UNDER ALTERNATIVE POPULATION DISTRIBUTIONS 
BY LEVEL OF EDUCATION (IN PERCENTAGE OF REAL DISTRIBUTION)
YL C LCD
All-primary 72% 82% 154%
Al-secondary 95% 98% 121%
All-post secondary 129% 123% 76%
Source: Authors ’ estimations.
Figure 14 summarizes the implications of those changes in terms of hnancing the 
lifecycle dehcit. It compares the relative importance of the three mechanisms available to 
hnance LCD (TG, TF and ABR) in the three hypothetical scenarios of population distri­
bution compared to the one observed. The total absolute value of the lifecycle dehcit is 
given in each scenario, while the bars measure the size of each hnancing tool. Public and 
private transfers (TG and TF, respectively) are computed combining the constant age 
prohles with changing population structure, while ABR is the balancing item. Note that 
TG is zero in the real situation, by construction (see Section 3), but this is not true in our 
simulation exercise where we assume the same level of education for the whole popula­
tion. As is shown, the huge LCD of an only primary educated society would need an 
important share of positive public transfers. On the contrary, public transfers would be­
come negative (more taxes paid than transfers received) in the case of the whole popula­
tion having post-secondary education. Along the same lines, the importance of both pri­
vate transfers and asset-based reallocations would also clearly increase with the 
population’s education level.
Finally, it is worth recalling that our analysis refers to 2006 in order to avoid the possible 
effects of the economic crisis. Our results could certainly be affected by the crisis, although 
a thorough analysis of this question is beyond the scope of this paper. However, by way of 
illustration, we estimated the per capita LCD prohles by level of education for 2012, which 
can be considered one of the worst years of the economic crisis according to macro-econo­
mic indicators. Comparison of the LCD prohles by level of education in 2012 and 2006, 
shown in Figure 15, are revealing: the economic crisis hit the less educated especially hard, 
their surplus period (over the working-age period) completely disappearing. Individuals 
with secondary studies also worsen signihcantly in terms of surplus while, on the contrary, 
the LCD of the most educated remains more or less the same.
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Figure 14: Lifecycle deficit financing with alternative population distributions
by level of education
Note: TG are public transfers, TFprivate transfers and ABR asset-based reallocations.
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
Figure 15a: Per capita LCD profiles by level of education in 2006 
(in 2006 euros)
Source: Authors ’ elaboration.
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Figure 15b: Per capita LCD profiles by level of education in 2012 
(in 2006 euros)
Source: Authors ’ elaboration.
5. Further remarks
The role of intergenerational transfers has been investigated over many years in the lite­
rature, although the lack of data has limited the extent of empirical evidence. In the early 
2000s the National Transfer Accounts project was launched, aimed at constructing an inter­
nationally comparable data set containing information about the reallocation of resources 
between ages in each country. NTA provide valuable information, not previously available, 
about how economic resources move across ages in a country in a given year. Nowadays, 
about 40 countries are involved in that project, and NTA estimations for several years are 
available for most of them.
Some extensions of NTA have been derived by introducing some kind of individual 
heterogeneity, in order to enrich the information provided even more. For example, NTA can 
be disaggregated by gender or by socioeconomic status of individuals or households. In this 
paper, we estimated the NTA for Spain disaggregated according to education level of house­
hold head -dehned as the person earning the highest income in the household. The reference 
year is 2006 in order to avoid any effects of the economic crisis. We aimed to identify the 
differences in behavioral patterns over the lifecycle according to education attainment. Our 
results are useful to assess the socioeconomic impact of the education transition experienced 
over recent decades. Moreover, they provide valuable information to evaluate the effects of 
welfare state policies, specihcally education.
The NTA prohles disaggregated by education level of household head obtained for Spain 
show signihcant differences through the lifecycle behavior patterns. First, the labor income
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age profile presents the typical inverted-U shape, peaking at around ages 40-50, but is con­
siderably higher for the higher education levels (per capita earnings at age 50 for individuals 
with post-secondary education are twice the earnings of those with only primary studies). 
This is due not only to higher-paying jobs, but also to the higher participation and employ­
ment rates for better educated individuals. Moreover, the profile shows a tendency of those 
higher educated individuals to remain longer in the labor market. Second, regarding the 
consumption profile, the pattern is again similar for the three education levels, with differen­
ces in level, although smaller than in the case of labor -high-educated individuals consume 
around 50% more than individuals with primary studies. As a result, per capita LCD is more 
favorable as the education level improves.
Regarding the mechanisms to finance LCD, significant differences are also observed by 
level of education. Public transfer profiles show that high-educated individuals pay conside­
rably higher taxes and contributions from age 25, although they also receive higher cash 
transfers during old age (through the pension system). We could not disaggregate in-kind 
transfers by level of education due to the lack of micro data, although the total age profile 
shows that they are especially important during childhood (education expenditure) and 
clearly lower than cash transfers during old age. This is a limitation of our analysis, because 
it prevents us from knowing how public in-kind transfers might be differently distributed 
according the socioeconomic status of the household. However, even without this disaggre­
gation, we are able to observe that children from lower educated households rely more on 
public transfers, which are mostly in-kind. Therefore, we can expect that this result would 
be reinforced by the eventual disaggregation of in-kind public transfers by level of education.
Private intra-household transfers show that individuals receive transfers from the rest of 
the household members until age 25, the amount of these transfers being bigger for the hig­
her educated. Between ages 25-65, all individuals give net transfers to other family members 
whatever their education level, although again the size of the transfers is clearly higher for 
better educated individuals. Finally, during old age, lower educated individuals hardly recei­
ve or give any transfers to other family members, while those with secondary and post-se­
condary studies are net recipients of some transfers. The size of inter-household transfers 
observed is small for any education level, especially in the case of inflows -received by in­
dividuals. Finally, asset-based reallocations play a role in the LCD financing of the elderly, 
being more important for individuals with post-secondary education.
Overall, our results reveal that, besides age population composition, education level has 
a substantial impact on the economic behavior of households and, hence, on the aggregate 
economy. Better educated households tend to participate more and longer in the labor mar­
ket, to produce more and, consequently, to consume more. They are capable of contributing 
to the public system with higher taxes and contributions, and they depend less on public 
transfers over their lifecycle. Therefore, particularly education seems to be crucial to sustain 
the welfare state in an ageing society. A simple simulation exercise, applying the profiles 
observed and assuming that the total population of 2006 has post-secondary education, 
shows that the aggregate LCD would go down considerably, as aggregate labor income
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would increase by 29% and consumption by 23%. This exercise shows the potential for 
education as a policy to alleviate the impact of ageing on the sustainability of the welfare 
state. Undoubtedly, this positive effect is subject to the fact that the labor market can effi­
ciently absorb those more educated individuals. The current high unemployment rate in 
Spain as a result of the current crisis is not signaling a very positive prospect in this sense. 
Nevertheless, this situation is expected to change once baby boomers start retiring from 2022 
on. One could argue that the near prospect of ageing does not seem to recommend increasing 
expenditure on education. Nevertheless, it is worth considering that such a policy would also 
act as pre-funding for future retirement pensions. As long as they are financed on a pay-as- 
you-go basis, more educated and hence productive individuals will be able to contribute 
more to finance it. Consequently, the austerity measures applied during the crisis could have 
found a better candidate than education expenditure.
There are also further policy implications regarding inequality. Our results show that 
higher educated parents spend four times more resources on private education of their chil­
dren than those with only primary studies. This could partly explain why the level of educa­
tion of the parents influences to a large extent the one achieved by their children -as pointed 
out by the OECD (OECD, 2015), on average individuals are 4.5 times more likely to attend 
higher education if one of their parents has a higher education degree than if both of them 
have only primary studies. This calls for the need for an effective public policy to compen­
sate for this gap and foster equal opportunities for all citizens.
Notes
1. LOGSE, Ley Orgdnica General del Sistema Educativo (General Organic Law on the Education System).
2. We also estimated the NTA profiles using the EPF population distribution instead of the EU-SILC, obtaining 
very similar results.
3. See UN (2013). For a subsequent update applied to European particularities see also Istenic et al. (2016).
4. Regarding the working age, labour income is the main source of financing as it is necessary to finance not only 
consumption, but also transfers, both public (taxes) and private (mainly to othe members of the household).
5. A non-zero asset-based reallocation for children is obtained by construction in the NTA, as public asset-based 
reallocation is imputed among the whole population.
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G E M M A  A B IO , C O N C E P C IÓ  P A T X O T , E L IS E N D A  R E N T E R ÍA
A N D  G U A D A L U P E  S O U T O
Resumen
En este trabajo se presentan los resultados de las Cuentas Nacionales de Transferencias (NTA) para 
España correspondientes al año 2006, desagradas por nivel educativo. Nuestros resultados indican que, 
además de la estructura de edades de la población, el nivel educativo también tiene un importante 
impacto en el comportamiento económico de las familias y por ende en el total de la economía. Los 
hogares con mayor nivel educativo tienden a participar más y durante más tiempo en el mercado labo­
ral, a producir más y, en consecuencia, a consumir también más. Pero como las diferencias en el con­
sumo son menores que en renta, dichos hogares son capaces de pagar mayores impuestos y contribu­
ciones al sistema público, a la vez que son menos dependientes de las transferencias públicas a lo largo 
de su ciclo vital. Así pues, la educación parece crucial para contribuir a sostener el estado del bienestar 
ante el envejecimiento.
Palabras clave: envejecimiento, educación, transferencias intergeneracionales, transferencias públicas, 
estado del bienestar.
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